

THE TRAINING OF A VIET-NAMESE CADRE:  
A PROPOSAL FROM THE SIMULMATICS CORPORATION

This is a proposal to train what the Communists call a cadre-- but on behalf of democracy and the government in South Vietnam.

1. The need:

On the loyalist side, there are few young men in Viet Nam who are committed to building up the country rather than helping themselves and their families. Perhaps the culture does not promote civic commitment, but the Viet Cong have been able to produce it.

There are but few young men on the loyalist side who are willing to devote themselves to the welfare of the villagers; there are many more in the Viet Cong. The energetic young men on the government side are mostly middle class and urban.

There are but few young men on the government side who understand mass organization and work at it; there are many more in the Viet Cong and other oppositionist groups.

There are but few young men on the loyalist side who are scrupulously honest and deeply committed to winning; there are many more in the Viet Cong.

Whatever may happen in Viet Nam in the short run, in the long run there will be no sufficiently stable victory over communism to permit us to pull out our troops until there is the kind of cadre that is now missing.

2. To meet the need:

We recommend training about 100 men a year into a cadre as

loyal, as effective, and as energetic as any the Viet Cong have.

We believe this is possible if (1) we focus an intensive effort on such a small group rather than scattering buckshot efforts and (2) we use some of the most modern training methods.

3. Training small numbers well pays off:

Lenin understood this.

Every nationalist and revolutionary movement demonstrates it.

So does the remarkable concentration of graduates of a few schools in many political leaderships since ancient Athens. Oxford and Cambridge, small universities, and a few even smaller public schools produced a half-century of British leaders. Two high schools in Budapest produced von Neumann, von Karman, Szilard, Teller and many other top flight scientists. The London School of Economics shaped the thinking of Modern India. The Sorbornne has created the present left wing French African leadership. Small cadres of committed men with a common educational experience can shape a country's history. We need to understand how such occasional hot-houses of leadership force-feed a generation of giants. Clearly it can be done.

4. Modern education research suggests some of the methods:

Most of the body of this memorandum is devoted to outlining a training program appropriate to the job at hand. These are applications of some principles that we have learned regarding the conditions under which training to such high levels occurs.



(1) It must be an intense and all-absorbing experience. The success of intensive language instruction with involvement 24, not 8 hours a day, illustrates the point.

(2) It must be an active experience. People learn by what they themselves say and do better than from what they hear and read. Teaching machines have shown that.

(3) It must involve positive reinforcement. People learn better from successes than from reprimands and frustrations.

(4) It must be an individualized emotional experience involving positive loyalty to a human model.

(5) It must be reinforced by a group.

(6) The training must be imbedded in the service of a higher purpose.

Well designed intensive training programs using tutoring, teaching machines and intensive methods can cut learning time by a factor of two or three or four, though admittedly at greater expense. In this instance the expense is worth while.\*

## 5. The Proposal

The Simulmatics Corporation, which has extensive expertise in action-directed social-science problem solving computer methods,

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\*The Peace Corps illustrates the operation of many of these principles and its success attests to them. It is an intense, all-absorbing, active experience which taps much emotion and is reinforced both by the model of its leadership and by the group itself. What we are proposing could be described with some strong qualifications as a domestic peace corps for Viet Nam. As will be seen below we plan to tap Peace Corp graduates extensively for this program.

training and also in counter-insurgency\*\* proposes to do the job of training 100 Viet Nameese a year at a cost of about \$25,000 per man.

We are prepared to initiate at once the detailed specifications for the following, so as to be ready for implementation without delay:

(1) Selection of trainees, to include individual criteria, team composition, recruitment and induction procedures.

(2) Security. The Simulmatics Corporation would provide, as an independent behavioral science research agency, an additional "cover" to avoid direct U.S. government involvement.

(3) Curriculum development, including both course content and methodology. For effective application of the teaching machines, teaching "games" and advanced techniques required, it is essential that these be specifically adapted to the purposes of providing skills and inculcating attitudes for this program.

(4) Selection, recruitment, indoctrination and language training for American training team members and instructors.

(5) Selection and preparation of training sites; solutions to the administrative and logistical support problems involved.

(6) Returning and re-integrating trainees into village life.

(7) Evaluation of effectiveness of program.

These topics are discussed in general terms in the following

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\*\*The Corporation currently has a contract from ARPA for research on urban insurgency, stressing socio-dynamic aspects.



paragraphs. An illustrative sample schedule is included.

If the methods prove successful in the first year, it would be continued for two additional years. A three year program would provide a cadre that could ultimately make South Viet Nam the showcase of South East Asia. During this second phase, an examination of modifications required would be made so that the program could be applied to other countries.

#### 5.1. Schedule for Training Teams

The 100 trainees in a year's program would be placed in twenty 5-man training teams. Each team would have a young American (e.g. a Peace Corps alumnus) living and working with them through the full 48 week program. For security reasons, no two training teams would ever meet. To achieve this objective they would be started sequentially through the program at two-week intervals. Thus the previous training team would have left a site before the next one arrives.

Since the purpose is to train people able and willing to live and work at the village and slum level, the sites of training will be in primitive conditions in the tropics 4/5 of the time. About 1/5 of the time the trainees will be in the United States so as to give them a chance to acquire a better understanding of American goals and methods, but it is essential that their experience not untrain them for life in their own land.

#### 5.2. Curriculum

The topics covered will include: group dynamics and group

leadership, political tactics, organization building, methods of rural development, hygiene and medical care, the history and character of Communism, the history and society of Viet Nam, American goals and the democratic way of life, selfdefense skills, literary skill improvement, English language improvement, teaching and communication skills, etc.

#### 5.3. Individual attention:

At each training site there would be one or more specialized teachers plus appropriate teaching machines, field stations or other necessary equipment. The teacher working with the American training-team member, provides at all times a 2 to 5 teacher-student ratio. This pattern permits great individual attention, thorough knowledge of the unique problem of each team member (thanks to the American team member), and thorough knowledge of the subject matter (thanks to the on-site teacher.)

#### 5.4. Team grouping:

The teams would be roughly grouped on two dimensions: urban-rural and language skills. Men from villages would devote more attention to agricultural topics; those from cities more to labor and similar topics. All would receive help in improving their reading, writing, and English, but they would be grouped to make their starting points fairly similar.

#### 5.5. Selection:

The trainees should be very able young men, not presently in



highly responsible or favored positions. A good selection would be a promising villager or village refugee of 18 or 20. Another good selection would be a 25 year old factory worker who has shown signs of leadership in a union. Another good selection would be a bright secondary or technical school student from a modest family who had shown signs of student leadership. A poor selection for this program would be a talented junior civil servant or experienced journalist. Ordinarily a poor selection would be a young army officer. (A sergeant might be a good selection, but we leave open policy questions about the extent of inclusion of military personnel.) Another poor selection would be a clerk who had been working in a USOM and had worked well with Americans there. The program is not intended for such Western-oriented and career-oriented persons, important as they may be. It is intended to fill what is now a critical gap in Vietnamese social structure -- loyalist political cadres at the mass action level.

#### 5.6. Staffing

The ideal American member of a training team is a returning Peace Corpsman. Other possible recruits are retiring U.S. military advisors from Viet Nam, returnees from Accion or other private groups like the Peace Corps. Each of these should have a month or six weeks training before joining their groups depending upon the language training needed. They live, eat, sleep, study with their groups.

The on-site teachers are partly U.S. nationals, partly locals. They must be people deeply involved in the special thing they are teaching but they need no prior academic expertise of a higher level than that of a junior high school teacher.

#### 5.7. Evaluation:

Any such program should have evaluation research built in from the start. At the end of every year, including the first, the Government must decide if this highly unique program is producing the results expected. Evaluation cannot be limited to rating classroom operations. It must extend to the net and results of the program in Viet Nam. It is essential to consider the full range of possible dangers such as infiltration, isolation of the participants after their return, etc. We propose to regularly allocate 5% of the budget for evaluation.

#### 5.8. Security:

Given the realities of the situation in Viet Nam we can expect an effective anti-communist cadre to become the targets of an assassination and intimidation campaign. To minimize this danger we propose both to provide some training in self-defense, and to keep the identity of trainees secret. Complete secrecy will be impossible.

There will beyond doubt be some secret Viet Cong agents in the 100 trainees themselves.\* A reasonable objective, however,

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\*A program of the sort here described might even break agents within it. Their presence is not an unmitigated evil.



is to prevent the Viet Cong ever compiling a complete list of trainees, and also to compel them to expend significant effort if they wish to identify even a substantial number. The limitation of contact by each trainee to his own team is a way of limiting the security breaches of which trainees are capable. Furthermore, to protect against an on-site staff member making a list as the trainees go by, they should use pseudonyms during the year.

#### 5.9. Political acceptability:

The program proposed is of obvious value to United States purposes. With United States government support, it should be possible to overcome some concerns that might bother the Vietnamese government. The practice of keeping trainee teams apart from each other will minimize the likelihood that the cadre as a whole would become an homogeneous political force. Still, creating a modern participant political system opens up the floodgates to many changes in Vietnamese life, and the cadre created by this program will not necessarily be supportive of the factions now in power. The program must be conducted in such a manner as to allay possible misgivings by the Vietnamese government.

#### 6. A Sample Schedule

This is an illustrative statement, not a crystallized plan.

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Duration</u>	<u>Topics and methods</u>	<u>Site</u>
	<u>Weeks number</u>		
1.	1, 2	Orientation to the program	S.E. Asia, e.g. Thailand, Phillipines, or Taiwan

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Duration</u> <u>Weeks number</u>	<u>Topics and methods</u>	<u>Site</u>
2.	3, 4	Group dynamics using Bethel methods to get team members to know each other, and to introduce notions of community action.	Same as weeks 1-2
3.	5, 6, 7, 8	Civic action exercise in nearby village to incorporate principles learned in unit 2.	Same as weeks 1-4
4.	9, 10, 11, 12	Individualized intensive literacy training at whatever level needed. Content to remain on civic action, political leadership, and communication. Both Vietnamese and English literacy worked on as appropriate, but primarily former.	S.E. Asia, new location near a city where teaching machines can be installed.
5.	13, 14, 15, 16	History, character and tactics of the Communist movement.	S.E. Asia, new location.
6.	17, 18	The history and society of Viet Nam.	S.E. Asia; perhaps same as weeks 13-16 perhaps new.
7.	19, 20	Intensive English language at whatever level needed.	E.W. Center Hawaii
8.	21, 22	Intensive English language, continued at some site such as the OK Moore program at Rutgers where outstanding modern methods are in use.	Continental U.S.A.
9.	23, 24	History and goals of American society.	A U.S. campus
10.	25, 26	Travel in U.S.A.	
11.	27, 28	Group summing up of political conclusions in context of observation of P.R. experience	Puerto Rico



<u>Unit</u>	<u>Duration Weeks number</u>	<u>Topics and methods</u>	<u>Site</u>
12.	29, 30 31, 32	An urban or rural site where a significant development effort (successful or not) is under way. Trainees participate, evaluate, compare with previous experience, and learn techniques.	Phillipines or Taiwan or S.E. Asia
13.	33, 34	Analysis of Vietnamese special technical problems in development.	S.E. Asia
14.	35, 36	Analysis of Vietnamese special political or social problems in development.	Same as weeks 33-34
15.	37, 38	Self-defense	Same as weeks 33-36
16.	39, 40	Techniques of political organization (political games to be used)	Same as weeks 33-38
17.	41, 42	Techniques of teaching and communication (mimeographing, radio, etc.)	Same as weeks 33-40
18.	43, 44	Planning and study of individual project related to what each will do after return (e.g. agricultural improvement, school teaching, etc.)	S.E. Asia
19.	45, 46, 47	Individual effort at practicing that project in the field.	Same as weeks 43-44
20.	48	Debriefing and preparation for return to Viet Nam	Same as weeks 43-47

Note: A site need be no more than a hut where eight persons can live. Since a group will be started every two weeks, two alternative sites need to be provided in parallel where the stay is four weeks, three sites in parallel where the stay is six weeks.

7. Budget for one class of 100 trainees

Director and 3 deputies (18 months)		
Salaries	\$150,000	
Travel and expenses	<u>60,000</u>	\$210,000
20 American team members (13 months)		
Salaries	\$180,000	
Travels	70,000	
Maintenance cost	<u>60,000</u>	310,000
27 On-site teachers		
Salaries	\$190,000	
Maintenance	50,000	
Travel for Americans	<u>30,000</u>	270,000
100 Trainees		
Travel	\$200,000	
Maintenance	<u>400,000</u>	600,000
23 sites		100,000
Teaching equipment, roughly	<u>100,000</u>	\$1,590,000
Evaluation 5% (4% salaries, 1% other)	<u>80,000</u>	
Total direct expenses		\$1,670,000
Overhead 110% of wages and salaries		\$ 642,000
S. & W. are 584,000		<u>\$2,312,000</u>
Profit - 8%		<u>185,000</u>
		\$2,497,000

This budget is preliminary.